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Blomquist and Christensen (2005) argue that welfare is initially decreasing in the price of an excludable
public good and that the case for a positive price for an excludable public good price is weak.  We
argue that this result follows from their particular characterization of the public good and that an alternative
and equally reasonable characterization overturns their result.  Hence the policy case for a positive
price on the public good is stronger than Blomquist and Christiansen suggest.  We also provide a flexible
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I.  Introduction 
  In a recent article Blomquist and Christiansen (2005) argue that a necessary 
condition to charge a price for an excludable public good to achieve Pareto efficiency in 
the presence of an optimal non-linear income tax is that the marginal valuation of the 
public good be increasing in leisure.  Furthermore, they argue that given this condition, 
welfare is initially non-increasing in the price of the public good (and may decrease 
before possibly increasing).  Thus the authors argue that if it is uncertain what the optimal 
second-best price of the public good is, it may be better to set a zero price than to set a 
low price in hopes of avoiding overshooting the optimal price. 
  We argue that this result follows from their particular characterization of the 
public good and that with an alternative and equally reasonable assumption, the condition 
that the marginal valuation of the public good is increasing in leisure is both necessary 
and sufficient to set a positive price for the excludable public good.  Hence the policy 
case for a positive price on the public good is stronger than Blomquist and Christiansen 
suggest. 
  In the next section, we set up and solve the model.  In the following section we 
explain the difference in results between our model and that of Blomquist and 
Christiansen and discuss different ways to characterize excludable public good access. 
Section 4 provides an analysis of the Samuelson Condition in our model along with some 
summary observations on the flexibility of our model to handle the various types of 
public goods that have been studied in the literature.  We conclude in Section 5. 
  Blomquist and Christiansen (henceforth B&C) model the government as 
providing G units of an excludable public good to which individuals can obtain access by    
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paying a per unit price q.  Upon payment of qg, they may consume g units of the public 
good with the constraint that  G g £ .  They motivate this characterization of excludable 
public goods with such examples as weather forecasts with g measuring the amount of 
information the consumer purchases up to the maximal amount available; an art gallery 
with g measuring the number of rooms visited and G the total number of rooms available; 
and TV broadcasting where g measures the number of channels purchased and G the total 
number available.   
  Implicit in B&C's model is the restriction that consumers can purchase an 
excludable public good only once.  Alternatively, we assume that consumers may enjoy 
the public good repeatedly, thereby allowing the government to charge a fee per use of 
the public good.  An on-line weather service could charge a fee each time an individual 
wished to access up-to-date weather information; an art gallery could charge an entrance 
fee per visit; and a TV network could offer on-demand movies.  This strikes us as a 
reasonable characterization of many excludable public goods (public parks, uncongested 
highways, museums, for example).    
  We shall see that the capacity constraint plays a key role in B&C’s model.  
Excludable public goods can be charged on a per use basis or with all-or-nothing pricing 
(access pricing).  B&C's model appears to be an example of per-unit pricing since 
different consumers may pay different amounts for the public good (depending on 
demand).  But in fact, their model is better understood as a model of multiple public 
goods with access pricing once the capacity constraint is binding. 
  B&C's modeling of public goods may well be appropriate in certain cases.  Since 
B&G conclude that only a weak case can be made for charging for excludable public    
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goods, however, it is important to determine if their conclusion is robust to the modeling 
of the public good.  We turn now to that question. 
II.  Optimal Pricing of Excludable Public Goods 
  Following B&C, we assume two types of consumers (high ability and low ability) 
and that the government utilizes a non-linear income tax to finance the public good.   
Type i consumers obtain utility over a consumption good, 
i c , the public good,  i g , and 
leisure, 
i L .  They face a time endowment Z = 
i H + 
i L  where 
i H  is the number of hours 
worked.  Their income is 
i Y =
i H ￿
i w , where 
i w  is their wage rate (
2 w > 
1 w ).   The 
government observes 
i Y  but not hours worked or the wage rate separately.  Also, as in 
B&C, the government is decentralized in that the tax agency cannot share income 
information with the agency providing the public good.   
  While those assumptions follow B&G, we now deviate by assuming that the 
public good consumption by type i consumers is a function of the number of visits to (or 
utilizations of) the public good,  i v , and the amount of the public good provided, G: 
(1)  i g  =  i g ( i v ,G ) 
where the function   i g  has the following properties: 
(2a)  i g (0, G) =  i g ( i v , 0) = 0 























    
    p. 4     
Equation (2a) says that no public good consumption can occur unless the government 
provides some positive amount of the good ( G ) and the consumer uses the public good 
( i v ).  Equations (2b) and (2c) state that public good consumption increases with use and 
the amount of the good provided by the government.  The last equation states that the 
marginal consumption value of visits to the public good increases with the amount of the 
public good provided.  Without loss of generality, we make the further simplifying 
assumption that public good consumption,  i g , is linear in visits (or utilization).
1  With 
that assumption, the function  i g ( i v ,G ) takes the form  ) (G h vi ×  with  0 ) 0 ( = h and 
0 ) ( ' > G h .  One simple characterization of public good consumption is  i g =  G vi × .   
  Individuals of type i maximize the utility function 
(3)  i U (
i c ,  i g , 
i H ) 
subject to the budget constraint 
(4) 
i c +  v p ￿ i v = 
i w ￿
i H - T (
i Y ) º 
i B  
where  v p  is the price per use for the public good set by the government, T (
i Y ) is a non-
linear income tax, and 
i B  is after-tax income.
2   
  It will be convenient to define the price of the public good,  g p , as the total 











g = º  
                                                 
1   This does not imply that utility is linear in visits.   
2   We ignore the problem of infinite demand for visits ( i v ) when the price of the public good is set equal 
to zero.  It is straightforward to include a private cost for the public good (for example, it costs time and/or 
money to travel to a park or a museum) to insure an interior solution.  Adding a private cost does not 
change our results.      
    p. 5     
The price of  i g rises with  v p and falls with G.   While the government's public good 
instruments are  v p  and G, we can equivalently characterize them in terms of  g p  and G.
3  
Lastly, we find it convenient to work with the indirect utility function (conditional on 
labor income) in terms of observables,  
i V (
i B , 













G h v G h v p B U
i ), ( ), ( max , where we’ve substituted in 
the individual’s budget constraint to eliminate private consumption.
4 
  As in B&C, we wish to characterize the information constrained Pareto efficient 
tax and public good pricing policy.  Specifically, the Pareto efficient allocation is 
described as the solution to the following problem:  
(6) 
G p Y g , , Y , B , , B 2 2 1 1 Max   
1 V (
1 B , 
1 Y , g p , G )    subject to 
(7)     
2 V (
2 B , 
2 Y , g p , G ) ￿ 
2 V  
(8)   
2 V (
2 B , 
2 Y , g p , G ) ￿ 
2 ˆ V (
1 B , 




2 B ) + 
1 N (
1 Y -
1 B ) +  g p (
1 N ￿
1 g + 
2 N ￿
2 g ) – m ￿G  ￿ 0 
     
where m is the marginal cost of producing the public good and 
2 ˆ V  refers to the utility of 
a high-ability type choosing the income – public good bundle intended for a low-ability 
type.
5  Equation (7) ensures the solution is Pareto efficient, equation (8) is a self-selection 
constraint to distinguish high and low ability types, and equation (9) is the government’s 
                                                 
3   Following B&C, we assume that  v p and  g p  are non-negative. 
4   Equivalently we could have defined the conditional indirect utility function 
i V in terms of before-tax 
income and tax payments rather than before- and after-tax income.   
5   As in B&C, we assume the usual single crossing property for utility of the two types.     
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budget constraint (assuming 
i N  type i people).  The Lagrangian and first order 
conditions for this problem are 
  (10)   L  = 
1 V (
1 B ,
1 Y , g p , G ) + ￿[
2 V (
2 B , 
2 Y , g p , G ) – 
2 V ]  +  
    ￿[
2 V (
2 B , 
2 Y , g p , G ) –
2 ˆ V (
1 B , 
1 Y , g p , G )] +  
    ￿[
2 N (
2 Y -
2 B ) + 
1 N (
1 Y -
1 B ) +  g p (
1 N ￿
1 g + 
2 N ￿
2 g ) –m ￿G ] 
(11)  1 B ¶
L ¶













1 N + ￿￿ g p ￿






 = 0     
(12)  1 Y ¶
L ¶
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(13)  2 B ¶
L ¶
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(14)  2 Y ¶
L ¶
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] – ￿￿m = 0 
 
where b  is the shadow price for the constraint on the high-ability type’s utility, r  is the 
shadow price for the self-selection constraint, and m  is the shadow price on the 
government revenue constraint.  











2 ˆ g  – 
1 g ]  + ￿￿ ￿ gg
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p ,    
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where S
i
gg  < 0 is the i
th type individual’s own-price Slutsky term and 
2 ˆ g  is the 
consumption of the public good by a high ability type mimicking a low ability type.  As 
B&C note, the first term captures the social benefit from relaxing (or the social cost from 
tightening) the self-selection constraint, while the second term describes the distortionary 
effect due to the wedge between the government price of the public good ( g p ) and the 
marginal social cost of access (zero given the assumption of non-rivalness in 
consumption).   Note that, from equation (15’), if the optimal price is positive, it is given 
by the formula  
















The analysis so far is analogous to that of Blomquist and Christiansen.   Let us now 
consider the demand for the public good for the type 1 consumer relative to a type 2 
consumer who mimics a type 1 consumer.  Blomquist and Christiansen's Proposition 2 
rules out the possibility of a positive price in the case that 
1 2 ˆ g g £ .  This also follows 
directly from inspection of equation (17).
6   
  B&C’s result that 
1 2 ˆ g g > is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a positive 
price on the public good depends crucially on their modeling assumption for the public 
good.  Once we replace rationing with our assumptions embodied in equations (1) and (2), 
we can show 
Proposition 1.  The condition 
1 2 ˆ g g >  is a sufficient condition for a positive price on the 
excludable public good to be Pareto improving from an initial position with  g p equal to 
zero. 
 
                                                 
6 The shadow prices r  and m  are non-negative by construction.  The partial derivative of the mimicker’s 
utility function with respect to B is positive by non-satiation in the private consumption good.    
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Proof.  At  g p  = 0, the first order condition for the access price is  
0 = ¶
L ¶
g p g p







2 ˆ g  – 
1 g ].  Since utility is increasing in after-tax income and the 
constraint on minimal utility for the high-ability type must be binding, 
0 = ¶
L ¶
g p g p
 > 0.   
QED. 
III.  Discussion 
  The condition
1 2 ˆ g g >  is central to both B&C’s result and our Proposition 1.  This 
condition means that public good consumption is a complement to leisure (since a high 
ability type earning the same income as a low ability type will consume more leisure).
7   
As intuition for this condition, recall that if a non-linear income tax is employed and 
utility is weakly separable between leisure and consumption goods, then the optimal tax 
rate on all commodities is zero (see, for example, Deaton (1979)).  Since a price for the 
public good in excess of the private cost is analogous to a commodity tax, the optimal 
commodity tax result suggests that  g p  should equal zero when utility is weakly separable 
in this fashion.  That intuition is correct.  A mimicking high ability type earns the same 
income as a low ability type but consumes more leisure (since his wage rate is higher).  
But the separability assumption means that these two consumers will consume the same 
amount of the public good (
1 2 ˆ g g = ).  Thus raising the price of the public good does 
                                                 
7 We show in the Appendix that the condition  1 2 ˆ g g >  is true if and only if  GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ > .  This 
relationship will be used to analyze optimal provision rules in the next section.    
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nothing to help distinguish between high and low ability types and so provides no welfare 
gain from distorting the price of the public good.
8   
  Where utility is non-separable and 
1 2 ˆ g g > , raising the price of the public good 
can help to distinguish between high and low ability types.  Starting at   g p  equal to zero, 
the benefit from being able to distinguish high and low ability types more than offsets the 
distortion arising from setting  g p  greater than zero.  This discussion emphasizes the 
importance of labor distortions in the optimal pricing of the public good.   
  The assumption of rationing in B&C’s model is key to understanding the 
difference in results between their model and ours.  In their model, both types of 
consumers are rationed over an initial range of prices for the public good between zero 
and  g p , and altering the public good price has no impact on utility.
9  At  g p , however, 
consumption of the pubic good begins to fall below G, the capacity constraint, and a 
marginal price increase must lower utility.  This is because a mimicking high ability 
consumer consumes the same amount of the public good as the low ability consumer (the 
rationed amount) and the marginal price increase does not differentially impact the 
mimicking consumer relative to the low-ability type (and so discourage mimicking).  But 
since  g p  is strictly positive, a first order welfare loss arises from the distortion to public 
good pricing.  Put differently, the benefit from relaxing the self-selection constraint in 
B&C’s model is second-order at  g p , while the distortion from pricing the public good 
greater than social marginal cost is first-order.  With our modeling of the public good, 
                                                 
8   Edwards et al. (1994) find an analogous result for non-excludable public goods. 
9   In this price range, raising the public good price is a lump-sum charge to the consumer which is rebated 
lump-sum through lower taxes.    
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precisely the opposite occurs.  A marginal increase in the public good price,  g p  , from 
zero has a first-order benefit in relaxing the self-selection constraint and a second-order 
impact on the public good pricing distortion. 
  Summing up, the condition 
1 2 ˆ g g >  is a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
positive price on the public good in our model.  B&C's conclusion that "[t]he policy case 
for a price may thus appear rather weak" (p. 61) depends on consumption of the public 
good initially being constrained as its price is raised from zero.  With an alternative and 
equally reasonable characterization of excludable public goods, we find that utility 
unambiguously increases as the price is increased starting at zero.  We thus find a 
stronger policy case to be made for pricing excludable public goods. 
  We’ve emphasized that the optimal pricing of the public good is sensitive to 
different modeling of the public good.  We next provide a few examples to guide thinking 
on the appropriate modeling of the public good.  To understand the importance of our 
distinctions, consider the following examples.  Two drivers are using an uncongested 
road.  One uses the entire road once per day; the other uses it twice each day.  In one 
sense both drivers are rationed if they’d prefer a longer road (B&C’s model).  In another 
sense, neither is rationed since they can use the road as many times as they’d like (our 
model).  
  As another example, consider an art museum with five rooms.  A museum visitor 
chooses to view three of the five rooms.  In our model, a decision by the museum owner 
to spend money to improve all five rooms increases the amount of the public good as well 
as the museum visitor’s utility since the rooms she does visit have been improved.  In 
B&C's model, an increase in G is the addition of a sixth room to the art museum.  The    
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increase in G, however, does not raise utility for the museum visitor since she is not 
rationed.  B&C argue that consumers get no benefit from this sixth room if they only 
wish to visit three rooms.  Their modeling really amounts to an offer of multiple public 
goods (where each room is a public good and accessible at a set price).
10   
  In fact, the examples that B&C offer to motivate their model can be viewed as 
bundles of multiple public goods.  Cable television service with ten channels can be 
viewed as a bundle of ten public goods.  The cable company could offer service on a per-
channel basis.
11  A weather forecast can be a bundle of multiple public goods.  One 
public good could be a basic service, and  a second public good a service with more 
detail.  And in both these cases consumers may visit and use these public goods 
repeatedly and could be charged on a pay-per-use basis in accord with our model.  
IV.  The Samuelson Condition Revisited 
  We next turn to the appropriate characterization of the Samuelson Condition in 
this second-best framework.  As has been noted in other models of public goods in 
second-best frameworks (Atkinson and Stern (1974), King (1986), Boadway and Keen 
(1993), and Edwards, Keen and Tuomala (1994) among others) the rule must be modified 
to the extent that leisure and the public good are related.  We make this relationship more 
precise in this section. 
  The analysis in the previous section shows that introducing  g p as the price of the 
public good allows us to draw on the literature on optimal commodity taxation with a 
                                                 
10 Note too the strong assumption that consumers receive no benefit from the expansion of G that might 
arise from the option value to visit the sixth room in the future.  We do not pursue this idea further in this 
paper. 
 
11   In fact, the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission recently proposed just this pricing 
scheme for satellite and cable television companies.  See Labaton (2005) for details.    
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non-linear income tax (e.g. Christiansen (1984), Edwards, et al. (1994)).  Analogous to 
Edwards, et al.'s Proposition 3 is  
Proposition 2.  Pareto efficiency in the provision of the public good, G, in the presence 
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i MRS is the marginal rate of substitution between the public and private good 
for a type i consumer and  GB S R M
2 ˆ  is the marginal rate of substitution between the public 
and private good for a high ability type choosing the income – public good bundle 
intended for the low ability type. 
 
proof:  see Appendix. 
This condition provides two modifications to the Samuelson condition that the sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution ( ￿ GB
i MRS  ) should equal the marginal rate of 
transformation ( m ).  First, it adds a term that depends on the social benefit from 
deterring mimicking by high-ability types.  Second, it adds a revenue term.  Focusing on 
this latter term first, the marginal cost of the public good is lowered to the extent that 
increased provision of the public good  ( G ) increases utilization (
i v  ) and therefore entry 
fee revenue (
i
v v p ×  ) which in turn allows a lower optimal value of  n p .  The 
modification of the Samuelson condition for revenue effects of increased public good 
provision is well known (see Atkinson and Stern (1974) for example).   
  The term including the difference in the MRS  between the mimicking and low-
ability consumer reflects the benefits arising from the public good's ability to help 
distinguish between high and low-ability consumers.  To see why this is so, assume that 
visits (
i v ) are unaffected by changes in the amount of the public good (G) so we can 
ignore the revenue term in (18).  Further assume that the mimicking high ability type 
places a higher value on the public good than does the low ability type ( GB S R M
2 ˆ  >    
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GB MRS
1 ).  Then ￿ GB
i MRS  > m at the second-best optimum.  If  
￿
GB
i MRS  is 
monotonically decreasing in G, then applying the Samuelson condition would lead to an 
overprovision of the public good.
12  Consider the allocation at the Samuelson condition, 
and now decrease G marginally.  At the same time, lower the taxes of all individuals 
choosing the high ability bundle by the amount  GB MRS
2 and reduce the taxes of all 
individuals choosing the low ability bundle by  GB MRS
1 .  Utility for any individual 
choosing the bundle intended for their ability type will be unchanged, and the 
government's budget remains balanced.  But the mimicker has a loss of utility since the 
value of the loss of the public good ( GB S R M
2 ˆ ) exceeds the gain from lower taxes 
( GB MRS
1 ).  This makes mimicking less attractive and allows for a relaxation of the self-
selection constraint, which in turn allows for an increase in utility for the low-ability 
types without adversely affecting the high-ability types.
13 
  As Boadway and Keen (1993) point out in the context of non-excludable public 









￿[ GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ - ] in equation (18) equals zero if utility is 
weakly separable between the consumption good and the public good on the one hand 
and leisure on the other hand.  Weak separability of this kind implies that the MRS 
between the private and the public good is independent of labor supply.  Since the only 
difference between a mimicking high-ability consumer and a low-ability consumer is 
their labor supply, the MRS for both must be the same.  And as discussed in the last 
section, weak separability also implies that the planner should not charge a positive price 
                                                 
12 Atkinson and Stern (1974) note that the aggregate MRS may not have a monotone relationship to G.  We 
will assume it here to develop intuition. 
13    Boadway and Keen (1993) use this same intuition in the case of a non-excludable public good with no 
entry fee.    
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for public good usage, so that both the second term and the third term vanish with this 
form of weak separability. We formalize this result as  
Proposition 3.  If utility for both types of consumers is of the form  i U ( i F (
i c , i g ),
i H ), 





i MRS =m .  
  In closing, we note that an appealing feature of our model is its general 
applicability to non-excludable as well as excludable public goods.  Non-rival public 
goods differ in two key aspects: first, they may be excludable or non-excludable, and 
second, it may be possible to consume varying amounts of the public good.
14  Thus we 
consider four possible types of public goods (see Table 1 below). 
We next give specific examples for how our model nests each type of public 
good.  The conditional indirect utility function is the solution to the maximization 
problem













G v G v p B U
i , , max  and the optimal provision rule is given by 
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Table 1. Taxonomy of Non- Rival Public Goods 
Possibility of Exclusion 
 
Non-Excludable  Excludable 
Exogenous  Case 1  Case 2 
Consumption 
Level 
Endogenous  Case 3  Case 4 
 
                                                 
14 Economists sometimes focus on the degree of rivalness of a public good.  We only consider non-rival 
public goods in this paper. 
15 Without loss of generality, we assume h(G) = G.    
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In the first case, the public good is non-excludable and consumption level is 
exogenous.  This is the classic public good first studied by Samuleson (1954) modified to 
account for the self-selection constraint to force the high and low ability types to 
distinguish themselves through their consumption choices.  This case was analyzed by 
Boadway and Keen (1993) in the presence of a non-linear income tax; national defense is 
an oft-cited example of such a good.  In the context of our model, we normalize the usage 
level ( i v ) for every citizen at 1 so that public good consumption for every consumer is 
G G v
i = .  Because the good is non-excludable, the provider cannot charge a per-use 
price for consuming the public good, so  v p = 0.  Thus the policy instruments available to 
the social planner are 
1 B , 
2 B , 
1 Y , 
2 Y and G, just as in Boadway and Keen, and the 
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1 2 ˆ - ]    
Note that this modified rule is the same as equation (9) in Boadway and Keen (1993).  
  Case 2 posits an excludable public good with exogenous consumption levels 
across consumers (conditional on consuming the public good).  Fraser (1996) is a good 
example of such a model.  While our model is not precisely analogous to that of Fraser, it 
is easily modified by allowing the low-ability types (for example) to opt out of 
consumption of the public good and only tax the high-ability types.  The term 
GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ -  in equation (18’) reflects the distortion arising from the self-
selection constraint and is analogous to the term in Fraser's equation (5) measuring the 
change in the marginal consumer of the public good due to a change in the tax level used    
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to finance its production.  As argued above, the Blomquist and Christiansen model falls 
in this category in the case where their capacity constraint binds. 
  The third case allows for endogenous public good consumption.  As we've argued 
in this paper, many public goods can be consumed in differing amounts based on the 
amount of access.  In this case, we allow for endogenous consumption of a non-
excludable public good.  An example of such a good may be my enjoyment of a 
neighbor's beautiful home as I walk by.
16  How often I choose to walk by the home (and 
enjoy the view) is endogenous. We can model non-excludability by simply constraining 
v p to zero.
17 
Finally, the last case is an excludable public good with endogenous choice of use 
(visits), the case on which we focus our attention in this paper.  We are not aware of other 
papers that analyze this case.  We do note an historic example of such a public good from 
Coase (1974) –  that of British lighthouses.  According to Coase, ships using the 
lighthouse paid fees that were "so much per net ton payable per voyage for all vessels 
arriving at, or departing from, ports in Britain" (p. 361).  Because only ships would come 
near the British lighthouses if they planned to enter or leave British ports, it was possible 
to levy a usage charge.  Presumably if ships evaded the payment, they would be barred 
                                                 
16 Excludability is clearly a technological phenomenon.  My neighbor could presumably build a sufficiently 
tall fence so as to exclude me from viewing the house.  This good is non-excludable if the cost of doing so 
is prohibitive.  See footnote 2 for a comment on the existence of an interior solution with a zero price for 
the public good use. 
17 Equation (18) in this case is again the same as Boadway and Keen's equation (9) with one minor 
difference: the consumption of the ability types may differ in our model.  But this is observationally 
equivalent to the situation where both types consume the same amount of G but their marginal utility of 
public good consumption differs.     
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from future entry into (or exit from) these ports, thereby denying them the use of the 
public good.
18 
Summing up, we feel that our characterization of the public good benefits in 
utility deriving from the amount of the public good provided (G) as well as usage (v) 
provides a flexible framework for thinking about a wide range of public good models. 
V.  Conclusion 
  Blomquist and Christiansen show in their model of constrained public good 
consumption that utility decreases in entry price for an excludable public good before 
(possibly) increasing.  We have argued that this result depends importantly on their 
characterization of the public good.  With an alternative and equally reasonable 
characterization of excludable public goods, we find that utility rises if an incremental 
entry fee is applied to a public good (starting from zero), so long as utility is not weakly 
separable between private and public good consumption on the one hand and leisure on 
the other.  We find, therefore, that their conclusion that a weak case (at best) can be made 
for charging for excludable public goods is not robust to the modeling of the public good.  
Hence the policy case for a positive price on the public good is stronger than Blomquist 
and Christiansen suggest. 
  We also characterize the modified Samuelson condition for the provision of an 
excludable public good with entry fee and find that the original Samuelson condition 
must be modified for an entry fee revenue impact as well as a distortion term arising from 
the desire to distinguish high-ability from low-ability consumers. 
                                                 
18 A slight complication arises in that the fees were capped at a given level of voyages (depending on 
whether the ship was a "Home Trade" or "Foreign-going" ship).  But this complication should not distract 
from our point about the existence of  an excludable public good with endogenous access.    
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  Another contribution of this note is a flexible characterization of public good 
consumption by allowing for endogenous use by consumers, a particularly important 
issue in the context of excludable public goods where an entry fee is charged.  Our model 
is general enough to subsume the non-excludable public good case by simply setting the 
access fee to zero.  Thus our model allows us to bring together a number of results from 
different papers in the literature on public good provision all under the umbrella of a 
single model.   
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Appendix 
1.  Derivation of equation (15’) from equation (11) to (15) 
  From 
i V (
i B , 













G G p B U
i , , max n n
n
,  the envelope theorem 
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i, that is, 
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g S p       Q.E.D. 
2.  Proof of Proposition 2 
First, we have another expression of the indirect utility function 
i V













i Y , v p ,G ) 
 
Note that except for Y
i  both 
i V and 
i V
* are all expressed in terms of the instruments that 
the government can control.  




i Y , v p ,G ) of equation 
(A-5), MRS is defined as 
(A-6)     GB















   with B being the numeraire. 
Next, let us verify the Slutsky equation for v (the access to the public good) with 
change in G. Consider the identity,  
(A-7)     ) , , ( G p u v v i
c i  =  ) , ), , , , ( ( G p u w G p e v v
i i
v
i i .  
 
Taking derivatives with respect to G, we get  

































describes changes in how much income is needed to keep the utility 
remaining unchanged when G gets higher, that is,     
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the equation (A-8) becomes: 
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Now, social welfare maximization problem with this indirect utility function is: 
(10)  L   = 
1 * V (
1 B , 
1 Y , v p , G ) + ￿[
2 * V (
2 B ,
2 Y , v p , G ) – 
2 * V ]   
    + ￿[
2 * V (
2 B , 
2 Y , v p , G ) –
2 * ˆ V (
1 B , 
1 Y , v p , G )] + ￿[
2 N (
2 Y -
2 B ) +  
   
1 N (
1 Y -
1 B ) +  v p (
1 N ￿
1 v + 
2 N ￿
2 v ) –m ￿G ], 
 
and the first order conditions are 
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 to equation (A-14), we obtain:    
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The last equality follows directly from applying equations (A-10) and (A-12). 
By dividing equation (A-14’) by ￿ and rearranging, we get: 
(A-14’’)  
1 N ￿ GB MRS
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The last equality follows from applying the Slutsky equation for v. Therefore,  
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From the identity 
i V (
i B ,

















. Thus,  
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.      Q.E.D. 
3.  Proof:
2 ˆ g > 
1 g  if and only if  GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ >  
First recall that the condition that 
2 ˆ g  > 
1 g  is identical to the condition that a mimicker 
values the public good consumption more than a type-1 individual. Since a mimicker 
and a type-1 individual have the same disposable income, it should be the case 
2 ˆ c  < 
1 c . 
Therefore, 
2 ˆ g  > 
1 g  if and only if  gc gc MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ >  when evaluated at the same ( g , c, 
B ).  
i) 
2 ˆ g > 
1 g  implies  GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ >  
From the definition of  Gc MRS  which implicitly assumes that other things are equal 
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, or  GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ > . 
ii)  GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ >  implies 
2 ˆ g > 
1 g  
By the same logic as above, 
2 ˆ g  < 
1 g  implies  GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ < ; and 
2 ˆ g  =  
1 g  implies 
GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ = . Thus the contrapositive is true:  GB GB MRS S R M
1 2 ˆ >  implies 
2 ˆ g >
1 g .   
Q.E.D.    
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